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Abstract: The Council of Trent established the requirements that a marri-
age be celebrated by the parish priest and two or more witnesses be present 
at the marriage (1563), but neglected to specify who the parish priest was. 
The decrees provoked confusion among both laymen and churchmen. Tra-
ces thereof can be found in the hitherto essentially unexplored documenta-
tion of The Congregation of the Council. This institution was founded in 1564 
specifically to resolve the questions that arose all over the catholic world by 
the application of the decrees promulgated at Trent. The related records are 
held in the Vatican Secret Archive. Through an examination of this documen-
tation, complemented by files of the Holy Office the author analyzes how the 
new rules were understood, experienced, used, circumvented, and manipula-
ted both by laymen and churchmen in order to end an unwanted marriage, 
to facilitate a union that was socially transgressive, opposed by family, or even 
heterodox, and to respond to pastoral concerns.
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Introduction
Historians of the family, crime, and everyday life agree that in the early modern 
period, the rules promulgated by the authorities remained largely unenforced. The 
administration of justice required taking into account the specific facts of each indi-
vidual situation, and so authorities exercised their power with some flexibility.2 
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Social historical research has for the most part used judicial sources in order to study 
deviance and repression.3 Recently, however, a “new social history” has emphasized 
the importance of examining the interactions between tribunals and those who 
appealed to them, recognizing that both parties contributed to the creation of the 
judicial system.4 The ultimate success of the rules was the result of negotiation5 – a 
negotiation that itself influenced the very definitions of these rules. Beginning from 
these premises, in this article I analyze the shifts in Italian marital norms and prac-
tices that resulted from the rules put into force by the Council of Trent in the decree 
Tametsi (1563). These revolutionary legal changes assigned control of marriage to 
the Church, thus removing it from families, clans, and the bride and groom them-
selves. Although the subject was hotly debated, the Council of Trent ultimately esta-
blished a set of requirements: a marriage had to be contracted by the parish priest, 
the banns were to be proclaimed for the three Sundays preceding the wedding, two 
or more witnesses were to be present at the marriage, and the event had to be recor-
ded in the parish register.6 Prior to the Council, the consent of the bride and groom 
had been sufficient to create a valid marriage regardless of whether it was celebrated 
publicly, privately, or secretly. Following Tametsi, the absence of parish priest and 
witnesses rendered the couple unable to wed and the bond invalid.7 
Of course, even prior to Trent the Church had tried to encourage the making 
public of marriages, primarily by means of the banns and the blessing of the union. 
The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) in particular established the couple’s obligation 
to publicly announce their intention to wed in church, so that parishioners had the 
chance to inform the priest of any impediment to the union. In contrast to Nor-
thern Europe,8 however, in Italy – and here particularly in the north-central regi-
ons – this obligation was largely ignored and the Church seems to have refrained 
from requiring its observance.9 Marriage contracted simply by the consent of the 
couple did not provoke any censure: even the ecclesiastical judges charged with 
deciding the question of their existence regarded them as contracts made „publicly, 
canonically, and before the church.”10 Secular authorities were alone in their strife to 
ensure the publicity of marriage. In the Kingdom of Naples, for instance, Ruggero II, 
King of Sicily, required as early as in the twelfth century that marriage celebrations 
take place before the church in the presence of a priest.11 Only with the Council 
of Trent did the Church launch a concentrated attack on „clandestine“ marriage – 
which now referred to marriages contracted without observation of the Tridentine 
requirements. Thanks to the united efforts of parish priests, confessors, bishops, and 
inquisitors, marriage became an eminently public and ecclesiastical event celebrated 
at a precise moment, with respect to which previously accepted or tolerated practi-
ces such as concubinage or the free association and sexual relations of betrothed 
couples were defined as transgressive.12
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The revolutionary importance of the Tridentine decrees becomes evident when 
the new rules are compared with actual preconciliar nuptial practices. Such compa-
rison is possible by looking at marriage trials, which, as source material, seem excep-
tionally close to these practices. Historians have often affirmed that these sources 
document marginal and deviant marital experiences, but I intend to use them here 
to understand the socially accepted marriage practices of people at all social levels, 
from slaves to the nobility.13
The confusion that the Tridentine decrees provoked among both laymen and 
clergy also left traces in the documentation of the Congregation of the Council 
which was founded in 1564 to resolve questions arising with the application of the 
reforming decrees of Trent. The congregation’s records are held in the Vatican Sec-
ret Archive and are to date essentially unexplored.14 In relation to marriage, the 
congregation mostly considered issues submitted by bishops across the Catholic 
world – either in their role as judges on ecclesiastical diocesan tribunals or when 
faced with queries from parish priests or confessors. The most interesting aspect of 
these sources is that they delineate and emerging jurisprudence. The Congregation 
of the Council’s decrees regarding a particular case became part of a corpus to which 
the successive decisions of this Congregation and other congregations (such as the 
Holy Office) tended to conform. However, the fact that the decrees of the Congre-
gation of the Council were not published until 171815 favored a flexible treatment of 
individual cases. It can be assumed that this constituted a conscious policy of the 
Congregation.16
The acts of the Congregation of the Council reveal the difficulty of subjecting a 
fluid phenomenon like marriage to the rigid rules that came out of Trent – a diffi-
culty that was of concern, though to differing degrees, to both laity and churchmen, 
at times even to the cardinals of the Congregation and the pope, who did not always 
agree on the resolution of a particular case.17 The issues considered varied widely, 
from the definition of a parish priest’s jurisdiction and a parishioner’s residence, to 
freedom of consent and parental authority, to the problem of marriage contracted 
by a false priest (or one who was in opposition to the bishop). The issues the Con-
gregation faced also attest to the persistence of a pre-Tridentine idea of marriage. Is 
a marriage really invalid if it is performed without a parish priest, even when cele-
brated in the presence of witnesses, recorded by a notary, and consummated by the 
betrothed?18 Such questions show that part of the ecclesiastical hierarchy shared lay 
values, and did not apply the Tridentine decrees in enthusiastic consent.
Examining the records of the Congregation of the Council (as well as some 
records of the Holy Office, which the Congregation sometimes consulted), I ana-
lyze how both lay- and churchmen understood, experienced, used, circumvented 
and manipulated the Tridentine rules requiring a parish priest to be present at wed-
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dings, to end an unwanted marriage, to facilitate a union that was socially trans-
gressive, opposed by family, or even heterodox, and to respond to pastoral concerns. 
Through this analysis I demonstrate that the rules established by the decree Tametsi 
did not definitively resolve the problem of uncertainty surrounding the formation 
of the marriage bond, but that instead the interpretation of the new rules gave rise 
to a new series of questions about both the existence and the validity of marri-
age. It thus appears that the Tridentine rules on marriage did not in fact succeed in 
ending the fluidity in matrimonial matters identified and analyzed in recent histo-
rical studies, which tend to treat this fluidity as an exclusively pre-Tridentine phe-
nomenon.19
I.
The first case addressed by the Congregation of the Council that we will consider here 
came from only a short distance. In 1568 the vicegerent of the cardinal vicar of the 
diocese of Rome turned to the cardinals with an unusual case that had come before 
him in his capacity as ecclesiastical judge of the diocese.20 Two young Romans, Clau-
dia and Prospero, had married at the home of Claudia’s uncle, Camillo Bevilacqua. 
His residence faced Via dei Calderai and adjoined the rented apartment facing Via 
del Monte Santo where Claudia lived with her mother, Belisandra. The two resi-
dences were in fact linked by an internal doorway that Belisandra had established in 
the shared wall to allow the two women direct access to Belisandra’s brother’s home, 
where they stayed „alla domestica“, and which they found more suitable for social 
entertainment, as it was more comfortable and more imposing than their own resi-
dence (“commodior et nobilior”). Thus, when going out in public Claudia and her 
mother preferred to exit by the door of the Bevilacqua home.
The preparations for the wedding took place in Claudia’s uncle’s residence, 
where Claudia took dancing lessons for three months and received Prospero’s visits 
and gifts. The uncle’s home was also the site of the conclusion of the dowry con-
tract and, following the publication of the banns in the church of Santa Maria sopra 
Minerva, of the marriage celebration itself, officiated by the parish priest of this 
church before witnesses and recorded by a notary. Following some conflict between 
the couple, another ceremony to reaffirm the union was celebrated in the same 
house, this time in a more private form without the presence of the priest but again 
recorded by a notary. On this occasion, Prospero again placed a ring on the bride’s 
finger. Later, the couple then consummated the marriage.
Shortly thereafter, Claudia, with the support of her mother, requested the dis-
solution of the marriage on the grounds that it had not been celebrated before her 
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own parish priest. Despite the fact that she and her mother passed a great deal of 
time at her uncle’s residence, even sometimes sleeping there, and notwithstanding 
that they had on various occasions participated in the parish life of Santa Maria 
sopra Minerva, the two women nonetheless lived in the adjoining apartment, which 
belonged to the parish of Santa Maria della Rotonda (the Pantheon). For this apart-
ment they paid rent, and under its windows, Prospero had serenaded the bride 
with a mattinata during their courtship. The Congregation of the Council informed 
the vicar’s vice regent that since not even Prospero belonged to the parish of Santa 
Maria sopra Minerva, the marriage was invalid. This conclusion, however, was rea-
ched only after a heated internal debate. While six of the cardinals opposed the mar-
riage, another three supported it.21 
The case of Claudia and Prospero is particularly interesting because it allows 
us to examine the reactions to the Tridentine decrees of the various parties invol-
ved: the bride and her mother, the groom, the parish priest, the notary, and the 
witnesses. It is clear that the Council of Trent furnished Claudia and Belisandra, 
likely advised by a legal expert, with an expedient for ending a union that had quic-
kly revealed itself undesirable, and which just a few years earlier would have been 
impossible to dissolve. 
The two young Romans had sought to incorporate the new nuptial rituals impo-
sed by Trent into the existing body of domestic marital rituals. Their wedding took 
place at home, which before Trent had been a frequent site of weddings of all types, 
whether an almost imperceptible moment of passage within an already establi shed 
relationship, a secret contract (or even one made on impulse), or a highly ritua-
lized celebration accompanied by feasting and dancing.22 It was not unusual for a 
marriage of the last type to be held at the house of the bride’s kin if it was bigger 
than her own. The same was probably the case with Claudia and Prospero’s marri-
age. We remember, for instance, that she took dancing lessons for three months in 
preparation for the event. The presence of the priest attests to the couple’s at tempts 
to ensure that their ceremony conformed to the Tridentine requirements. Prior to 
Trent, no priest was necessary and the officiant at a wedding was often a family 
member – generally the bride’s father, brother, or uncle, but sometimes even her 
mother23 or employer – or, if she had no family, her guardian or someone with 
responsibility for protecting her honor.24 Women were not excluded from this role,25 
although a male officiant was held to be more reassuring, as becomes evident in the 
case of a woman who asked her male neighbor to officiate at her marriage since „she 
[had] no man in the house“ (1519).26 An officiant did not even need to be Catholic. 
In Venice in 1525 the marriage of the nobles Alvise Caravello and Diana Minio was 
officiated by the bride’s physician, who was Jewish. 27 
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Certainly the role of officiant could be filled by a priest – as happened ever more 
frequently over the course of the sixteenth century – but his presence was not neces-
sary to link the wedding to the sacred sphere. An image of the Virgin,28 an open 
tabernacle,29 a crucifix,30 an oath31 – especially if taken while touching the Bible – 
the sign of the cross made in front of the bride,32 the invocation of the Father, Son, 
and Holy Ghost, the simple expression “as God and the Holy Mother Church com-
mand”33 are all elements that the laity commonly held capable of locating a marri-
age in the realm of the holy. Whether the role of officiant was filled by a layman or 
a churchman mattered so little to onlookers that in one case a witness, when asked 
who had contracted the marriage, could not remember if it had been the rector or 
“one of the household’s girls” who were present.34 For all that prior to Trent anyone 
could officiate at a wedding, the role of celebrant was often filled by a notary, a 
figure who was indeed present at Claudia and Prospero’s wedding. The family had 
also made sure to have a parish priest present, but no one had paid attention to the 
fact that he was not the priest of the bride’s parish, as the new rules required and as 
the Congregation of the Council reiterated. Still there were enough clues to the defect 
of jurisdiction that they must have made at least the priest suspicious. During the 
earlier ceremony blessing the uncle’s house the priest had asked Claudia and Beli-
sandra to explain their failure to take the required Easter communion. When the 
women assured him they had received the sacraments in the parish of Santa Maria 
della Rotonda, he was satisfied. “It is enough that you have taken communion”,35 
he affirmed, overlooking that after the Council of Trent it was no longer optio-
nal where one took communion. The majority of the Congregation reconfirmed 
this, and uttered their suspicion that the priest had declared the two women his 
parishioners in order to avoid the penalty for contracting the wedding of a couple 
who were not residents of his parish.36 The notary, too, was shown to be at fault, 
since he had apparently not held it important to establish the parish of the bride and 
groom orally, thus neglecting a fact pertinent „to the essence itself of the contract“ 
(“ad essentiam ipsiusmet contractus”).37 He, like the parish priest and the wedding 
guests, had probably considered the presence of a priest (and thus the embodi-
ment of the Church), and not that of a representative of the jurisdiction, the more 
important factor uniting the couple. Judging by the many questions brought before 
the Congregation that addressed the validity of marriages contracted before priests 
other than the couple’s own parish priest, this belief was not uncommon.38
Prospero’s trial strategy in particular harks back to pre-Tridentine notions of 
marriage – and to corresponding suits that sought to prove the validity of a mar-
riage. It is notable that, without losing sight of the goal of proving that his bride 
did indeed belong to the parish of the priest who had celebrated their wedding, 
Prospero also did mention a series of facts that should, in his opinion, prove the 
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couple’s intimacy and therefore the existence of the marital bond. The bride and 
her mother visited him at his house where they ate lunch with him; he returned 
with them to their house in Santa Maria sopra Minerva and stayed with them there; 
Claudia often went out dressed as a bride (“tanquam sponsa”); Prospero had kissed 
Claudia in the presence of her relatives. Especially the last fact had great symbo-
lic, and therefore legal, weight, since prior to the Council of Trent in many regi-
ons of Italy, the nuptial kiss (along with touching hands and the ring) was one of 
the principle signs of consent.39 The couple’s intimacy, permitted and controlled by 
the bride’s family, was further attested by the fact that Claudia would publicly sit in 
Prospero’s lap, and that her family allowed Claudia and Prospero to stay in a room 
alone and unmonitored.40 
In the marriage disputes tried in the dioceses of the Italian peninsula just a few 
years earlier, such actions would have created a strong presumption of marriage, 
even rendering superfluous proof of the oral expression of consent. As noted above, 
the pre-Tridentine doctrine of marriage did not require any specific formalities for 
the formation of a valid marriage, which depended exclusively on the consent of 
the bride and groom. And although Thomas Aquinas stated that the „form“ of the 
sacrament of marriages consisted in the words with which the bride and groom 
expressed their consent, the canon law literature as a whole did not distin guish 
between the words of consent and customary rituals as sharply as Aquinas did. 
Canonists tended to introduce the “signs” of consent – that is, rituals and customary 
practices – into the legal discourse, and to attribute probative value to them. While 
the preeminence of the words of consent was repeatedly affirmed,41 Peter Lombard 
states that consent could be expressed “with words,” but also “with other unmista-
kable signs,”42 which was extended by the authority of the Decretum to encompass 
the entire symbolic system of medieval marriage. The list of rituals that canon law 
literature recognized as relevant to ecclesiastical courts with jurisdiction over mar-
riage was open. The numerous references in the Gloss, Hostiensis, and elsewhere to 
“the custom of the place,” and “the practices of the land”43 encouraged pre-Triden-
tine judges to investigate local nuptial rituals.44 Thus Prospero confronted the vice-
gerent and later the cardinals with a series of practices customarily linked to mar-
riage.
Another aspect of Claudia and Prospero’s nuptial celebration that was markedly 
preconciliar was its repetition. We have seen that the couple repeated the wedding 
ceremony, and again recorded it with a notary, after a period of conflict. Such events 
are frequently documented prior to the Council of Trent, when the repetition of a 
wedding ceremony was intended to guarantee the existence of a marriage, which 
as a contract was strengthened by repetition, and as a sacrament could be admi-
nistered many times.45 The presence of the notary, but not the parish priest, at this 
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repeated ceremony attests to the weight of the pre-conciliar nuptial tradition.46 In 
the eyes of the post-Tridentine ecclesiastical judges, the absence of the parish priest 
completely deprived the second ceremony of any effect. It did, however, reassure the 
groom, who submitted it as proof in court, and probably also the bride, who only 
after this second ceremony consented to the consummation of the marriage – an act 
that in itself, in the opinion of the Congregation, resulted in punishment to Clau-
dia that was appropriate to „her wickedness, because she was known by a man and 
will remain defamed“.47
II.
The first section has shown how the new rules that emanated from Trent could pro-
vide a legally valid way to end an unwanted marriage. This section will examine how 
these rules could be used to contract a marriage that was opposed by family, socially 
transgressive, or even heterodox.
While it is true that the decree Tametsi confirmed that only the consent of the 
couple, and not of their families, was required for a valid marriage, the imposi-
tion of the new obligations that the impending event be publicized with the banns 
and that the parish priest be present increased familial and social control of mar-
riage enormously. Prior to the Council of Trent a couple could contract a marriage 
at any hour of the day or night and do it anywhere: in a house, in the street, in the 
fields, or at a tavern as easily as in a church. Mere inattention of family members 
could be enough to give a couple the opportunity to wed. It was possible for a young 
man balancing on a ladder to slip a ring onto the finger of a thirteen-year-old girl 
through the grating of her window, or for two lovers to exchange consent while tou-
ching hands through a hole in the wall.48 Although contracted in secret, the church 
still considered these marriages as valid and therefore indissoluble.
Of course, the persistence of the bride and groom was necessary to give such 
a marriage effect in the face of familial opposition. Many pre-Tridentine trials 
regarding presumed marriages had their origin in a family’s discovery that a son 
or daughter had contracted a socially unequal marriage and the determination to 
revoke the union. While the ecclesiastical tribunal offered a concrete opportunity 
to escape parental control (the party in danger of intimidation was removed from 
his or her family and submitted to stringent questioning by the judge with the goal 
of discovering the interviewee’s true wishes), few took it. For every young woman 
who took the opportunity offered by the ecclesiastical judge to be reunited with her 
husband, a host of young women (and young men) were ready to submit to the will 
of their families and deny their marriages, declaring they wanted only „what my 
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kin want“49. Before Trent, if part of a couple denied that a wedding ceremony had 
taken place, the community could still claim the existence of the marriage by citing 
a combination of signs and behaviors. The ecclesiastical judge could interpret the 
evidence and decide in favor of the marriage. After Trent, the only valid marriages 
were those contracted in accordance with the rules imposed by the council. Per-
forming this ceremony without familial approval was difficult. It required not only 
determination, but also the support (or at least the presence) of the bishop and/or 
the parish priest.
Recognizing that the requirement that marital intentions be made public with 
the banns could set in motion schemes to impede weddings, the council fathers pro-
vided that publication could be omitted at the bishop’s discretion when there was 
reason to suspect that a marriage might be „maliciously obstructed“. In this situ-
ation, they recommended (but did not require), that the banns be said before the 
consummation of the marriage. In practice, however, this only served to unleash 
the family’s opposition, despite the fact that the marriage ceremony had already 
taken place.
During the late 1560s, the bishop of Amelia, without veiling his indignation, 
asked the opinion of the Congregation of the Council on a marriage he regarded as 
„firmly“ indissoluble.50 He recounted how based on the request of the master of 
ceremonies and the employers of the bride and groom he had allowed two servants 
to marry in church while postponing the banns until after the ceremony. After the 
marriage was duly contracted and the first of the banns read, the groom and his 
older brother appeared before the bishop to have the marriage declared invalid. 
While the young man confirmed that he had married indeed, and done it gladly,51 
he said that he now wanted to give up his spouse whom his brother did not like. 
Informed by the bishop that the bond was indissoluble, the brother „calmed down 
to a certain degree“, but returned a few days later claiming that the marriage was not 
valid because it had not been contracted by their own parish priest. The bishop had 
to confirm. He had delegated the priest of the groom’s father’s parish, unaware of 
the fact that the sons had moved away after their father’s death. He hastened to add, 
however, that he had done so in error, not out of malice.52 The bishop further pro-
vided a list of reasons to support his belief that the marriage was valid: prior to the 
wedding ceremony the young man had solemnly confirmed by oath to marry the 
serving girl; he had then married her by words of the present tense (“per verba de 
presenti”) as described above; he had admitted in the bishop’s presence that he had 
married her and had at the end declared that if his brother agreed he would have 
gladly kept her as his wife. Had the master of ceremonies and other intermediaries 
informed him of the correct parish priest, the bishop said, he would have appoin-
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ted him to perform the ceremony; however, he affirmed that this was not „a clan-
destine marriage, nor one contracted in contradiction of the form of the sacred Tri-
dentine council“.53 The Congregation unanimously supported the marriage, but not 
because the young man had confirmed he had married the serving girl and wanted 
her as his wife, nor because of the bishop’s intentions regarding the appointment of 
the priest, but because of the simple fact explicitly affirmed in Tametsi that a bishop 
had the authority to delegate the contraction of a marriage to a priest who was not 
the parish priest.54
In the above case, the humble origins of both parties involved allowed the 
bishop to recognize the efforts of the groom’s family to impede the union as clearly 
improper. In the case of mesalliance, however, the bishop or priest did not always 
apply the doctrine of consent. Bishops and priests could be influenced by class bias, 
either because of their own membership in the nobility (as was often the case with 
bishops), by the desire to avoid the social tensions generated by socially unequal 
marriage, or even by threats.
If a priest impeded a wedding, the bishop could compel him to contract the 
marriage under threat of punishment, or could simply delegate the role of offi-
ciant to another priest. But if both bishop and priest obstructed the celebration, the 
couple could achieve their objective with a „surprise“ or „unruly“ wedding, which, 
though it carried serious sanctions (to which, however, I have found no reference 
in the records of the Congregation of the Council) was nonetheless valid.55 While the 
Council of Trent established that the parish priest had to be present at the celebra-
tion of a wedding, the Congregation of the Council affirmed that he need not be there 
willingly. The jurisprudence regarding surprise marriage originated with a Toledan 
suit over the validity of a marriage celebrated without the priest present uttering a 
single word. The Congregation declared the marriage valid because the sacrament – 
and bond – merely required that the priest hear the words of consent (1580).56 It did 
not matter if he pretended not to have heard, or fled just as the groom expressed 
his consent – as long as the bride managed to say, „I, too,“ while nodding her head. 
Similarly, weddings were valid when the priest was lured to the house of one of the 
parties by deceit (for example, on the pretext of hearing the confession of someone 
who was ill),57 or if the marriage was contracted before the proper parish priest, but 
in a church other than the parish church.58 
A surprise wedding could enable a bride to extract herself from another existing 
marriage, if this marriage had been contracted against her will. This was the case in 
Rieti when Berta and Stefano, having circumvented familial opposition to get enga-
ged, celebrated a surprise marriage before the parish priest and the local congrega-
tion at the end of mass. Earlier, Berta had been forced by her family to marry a man 
named Antonio in the proper Tridentine form.59 Her surprise marriage to Stefano, 
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however, counted as striking proof of absence of consent to her marriage to Anto-
nio, and set into motion the trial that ultimately confirmed the invalidity of that 
first marriage. In this way, the desires of the directly interested parties found a mea-
nes of expression in opposition to familial desires.
Surprise marriage is amply documented across Europe during the entire period 
under consideration here and involved people at every level of society.60 In Italy it 
was even used to contract marriages of mixed confessions in order to get around the 
1596 bull of Clement VIII, which prohibited Italian Catholics from marrying those 
belonging to other confessions, and authorized heresy proceedings against trans-
gressors.61 Because of this, the two cases that follow are held in the Archive of the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (the Holy Office).62
In 1725 the bishop of Pisa informed the Holy Office that after a long period of 
“scandalous” cohabitation, „a heretic and a Catholic widow“ in Livorno had during 
mass, as the priest turned to the faithful requesting them to pray, declared that they 
took each other as husband and wife. Afterwards, they withdrew „to a village“, where 
they lived „as a married couple“.
In the eyes of the Church, a marriage between members of different confessions 
could only be legitimately contracted with a papal dispensation. Such dispensation 
was granted only very rarely, usually under the following conditions: the Catholic 
spouse did not run the risk of conversion, and any children born of the union would 
be brought up in the Catholic faith; the marriage was in the public interest; or the 
Catholic could not hope to find a spouse of his or her own confession of equal social 
status.63 Whether because they knew they could not satisfy the requirements for a 
dispensation, did not know how to appeal for one, or whether they just preferred a 
surprise marriage as a quick and reliable way of obtaining a valid bond, this couple 
chose a path that made them immediately suspect of heresy in the eyes of the bishop 
of Pisa and on the basis of the bulla of Clement VIII.
While the Holy Office was not known for its openness toward mixed marriages, 
the officials did not deem it appropriate to proceed against the couple. In accord 
with the bull of Clement VIII, they remanded the case to the bishop – to whom they 
recommended, however, that the couple be not permitted to cohabit, because such 
cohabitation constituted „a pernicious example“ fraught with „the most serious 
consequences“. Unable to nullify the marriage of two people of different confessi-
ons – which was illicit, but valid nevertheless – the bishop imposed a separation.
In contrast to the above case, the marriage contracted between a Genoese Catho-
lic and an English Protestant resident in Livorno was declared null. The couple tra-
veled to the diocese of Carrara to marry by surprise, believing that the groom’s nati-
onality exempted him from observance of the decrees of the Council of Trent. Since 
the Trent decrees had not been published in England, the couple deemed it suffici-
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ent to contract marriage before a public official, „which, in the case of marriage, is 
the parish priest“, and witnesses. The bishop of Pisa, however, declared the marri-
age null with the approval of the Holy Office, probably on the basis of the widely 
established rule that a couple planning to wed was not subject to the jurisdiction of 
their parish of origin but to that of residence. In addition to confirming the bishop’s 
decision, the Holy Office instructed the archbishop of Genoa, the bride’s city of ori-
gin, to forbid the couple to cohabit should they move into his diocese. While assu-
ring the Holy Office of his complete cooperation, the bishop of Genoa used an 
expression that bespeaks a certain ambivalence in the distinction between nullity 
and illegality of marriage: he said that he would do anything to possibly keep the 
woman from living with her „husband“.
About thirty years earlier, in Torino, a Catholic man and a Protestant woman 
(“heretica”) similarly contracted a surprise marriage before a parish priest which 
was not their own. The couple was shrewd enough to have their union ratified by 
proxy before the vicar general, while he celebrated mass. During the ceremony, 
agents replacing the bride and groom left letters of proxy on the altar, thus assu-
ring the validity of the bond. Nevertheless the bride was punished with a „healthful 
penance decided by the bishop“.64
Those who wished to wed a spouse above or below their social status also had 
to recourse to marry in a diocese, city, or parish other than their own in an attempt 
to elude familial opposition and social disapproval. Such marriages met with suc-
cess only when the couple could prove that the move was not temporary. While one 
exceptionally transgressive marriage of a noblewoman with a servant was declared 
null because the couple had only moved for the wedding,65 other unions were 
declared valid. The couples had obviously believably demonstrated that they had 
lived in the parish of their marriage for nine, or three, or at least one month, or that 
they moved with the intent of permanent residence.66 
III. 
We have seen that many of the questions posed to the members of the Congrega-
tion of the Council involved sacramental jurisdiction and the definition of who was 
the couple’s parish priest. Another frequent issue was the orders of the officiant. In 
the decades following Trent a rule christallized holding that an officiant delegated 
to celebrate a marriage by the parish priest or bishop must have held major orders 
(save for exceptions as we shall see), but that this was not required of the parish 
priest himself. In De Sancto Matrimonii Sacramento, Thomas Sanchez formulates 
this rule clearly. Sanchez begins with the basic conciliar specification that a wed-
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ding takes place “in the presence of the parish priest (‘parocho’) or other priest (‘alio 
sacerdote’) by license of the parish priest or bishop”. He explains that if the interpre-
tation of the word „other“ assumes in the parochus the quality of the sacerdos ( in 
other words, priesthood), the Council did not explicitly mention it. Priesthood, the-
refore, was no necessary condition to make the parochus the witness required by the 
Council. It would rather suffice to hold a parochial benefice.67 On March 11, 1593, 
the Congregation of the Council decided accordingly and nearly unanimously (with 
only Cardinal Landi disagreeing) in the case of a marriage celebrated by a parish 
priest who had received his first tonsure, but had not yet been promoted to holy 
orders.68
Since marriage is a favorabilis matter – which means that ambiguous cases 
should be decided in favor of the nuptial bond – Sanchez held that a delegate may 
legitimately celebrate a wedding ceremony even if he is merely a deacon or sub-
deacon.69 Only the minor orders were decisively excluded from this role, and even 
this was debated. The records of the Congregation of the Council contain the case 
of a man from the Veneto who doubted the existence of his marriage. The mar-
riage was contracted with the Archbishop’s license during a period of plague 
(most likely between 1575 and 1577) before a cleric who had received only minor 
orders and acted as sacristan of the parish church. The Congregation of the Coun-
cil unanimously held the marriage to be null. However, when presented with the 
Congregation’s report, the pope declared himself in favor of the marriage. After 
hearing the detailed opinions of the cardinals, he changed his mind, but was still 
not ready to make a final decision. He instructed the patriarch of Venice to recon-
cile the couple “in the manner of a pastor” (“pastorali caractere”), and to encourage 
them to contract their marriage once more in the proper form. Should he not suc-
ceed, the patriarch should inform the pope of the age and condition of the bride 
and groom, of any disparity of status, and whether the marriage was contracted 
out of necessity – that is, for the health of their souls, the legitimation of children, 
or another similar reason. The pontiff further demanded to know the cause of the 
couple’s differences – only then would he communicate his decision to the Congre-
gation. After the investigations, the patriarch informed the Congregation and the 
pope that the two young people were of the same age and status. The groom was 
a barber and the bride lived as the concubine of a man whom she would marry if 
she were declared free of the first marriage. Having assessed the situation, the pope 
declared the marriage null.70
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IV.
The last case we will examine involves the problem of weddings performed by false 
priests. On July 11, 1736 the bishop of Treviso wrote to Rome for help. The bishop 
recounted how in 1723 Andrea Filippo Pin, a laymen from Belluno, appeared at the 
diocese of Treviso pretending to be Nicolò de Prandis, a priest from Pescantina in 
the diocese of Verona. Pin presented letters of recommendation from the bishop of 
Verona, on behalf of which bishop Morosini, the current bishop’s predecessor, gran-
ted Pin a license to hear confession and to assist the parish priest of Croce di Piave 
in the administration of the sacraments and the cure of souls. Shortly thereafter Pin 
left the diocese to return in 1726 under the name Antonio Liviero. This time, he car-
ried letters from the curia of Padua, which, based on letters of recommendation Pin 
had obtained in the diocese of Ceneda (now Vittorio Veneto), attested to his belon-
ging to that diocese. Thanks to these letters, he was appointed confessor and assis-
tant to the parish priest in the cure of souls in the parish church of Salzano in the 
diocese of Treviso. He served in the same capacities in two other villages in the same 
diocese, Piombino and Carpendo, appointed by the bishop he had already fooled 
with his earlier credentials. Suspended from hearing confession at the end of 1727 
“for certain crimes” and thrown out of the diocese, Pin returned shortly thereafter 
under a new name and a forged confessor’s licence, which he updated from time to 
time. This time, Pin did not present himself to the bishop. For four years, he served 
as chaplain and pastoral assistant in the diocese of Treviso, partly in the village of 
Covolo, partly in the village of Corte. Accused before the bishop of “other crimes” 
and asked to account for his right to hear confession, he tried to flee but was caught 
by the Inquisition of Padua which, after unmasking him, condemned him to death 
and consigned him to the secular arm for execution on 18 March 1736. The inqui-
sitor of Padua informed the bishop of Treviso that Andrea Pin was not a priest, and 
instructed the bishop to inform the laity that they must repeat their confessions, 
which were rendered invalid by the false priest’s imposture.71
While the inquisitor seemed concerned only with the validity of confession (the 
sacrament that had particular relevance to his office),72 the bishop of Treviso was 
tormented by doubts pertaining to his own pastoral role: Were the marriages that 
the false priest performed by license of the bishop valid? Theologians meeting in 
Venice on the subject, came to no agreement. Appealing to the authority of Mar-
tin Bonacina and Claude Lacroix, some argued that a marriage celebrated by epis-
copal license by someone commonly held to be a parish priest was valid, but others 
disagreed. And if these marriages were indeed valid, what of the ones Andrea Pin 
contracted using his false license? The bishop of Treviso therefore appealed to the 
Venetian nuncio who, although inclined himself to favor the validity of the marri-
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ages given the dramatic consequences that would follow their nullification, decided 
to send the matter on to Rome. “Tormented by the horror that for many years so 
many souls entrusted to his pastoral care” had been “betrayed by a villain’s decep-
tions,” the bishop explained, he now asked the Holy Office to declare valid the mar-
riages officiated by Pin, since along with the fate of some 170 couples, social peace 
was at stake. The bishop rejected the proposal that the weddings be re-celebrated as 
unsuitable. He was convinced that many would not fulfill their obligation to their 
spouses, and would instead consider themselves free of the marital bond, bringing 
about serious consequences for the children, who would suffer the disgrace of ille-
gitimacy, and in matters of inheritance. The result would be vendetta, feud, and dis-
order of every sort.73
The resolution of the matter was entrusted to Tommaso Sergio and Ludovico 
Valenti, who were both members of the Holy Office, while Valenti was also a pro-
motor fidei. Both agreed that the marriages performed by the false priest were valid. 
Their opinion rested not only on the authority of Bonacina and Lacroix cited by 
the bishop of Treviso, according to whom the fact that the officiant was commonly 
held to be the couple’s parish priest was enough to make the marriage valid; but also 
on the authority of many other theologians, and particularly Thomas Sanchez, who 
was capable of single-handedly dispelling every doubt on the matter of validity – 
and who had in fact encountered a similar problem.74 
According to Sanchez, the validity of a marriage required priesthood not accor-
ding to divine or natural law, but to positive law. Positive law held that while the 
Church forbids a priest or bishop from giving license to contract marriage to a non-
priest, common error and the putative title sufficiently enabled the Church to con-
fer that capability on a non-priest. However, the error of just the bride and groom, 
or just the bishop, or an obvious error would not have been a sufficient condition: 
the error had to be likely.75 Otherwise, the declaration of invalidity of the marriage 
would not cause scandal – an element evidently necessary for the Church to be able 
to intervene to repair the defect of the celebrant.
Sanchez, however, also argued that common error could not justify the validity 
of a marriage if the celebrant had not been delegated by a legitimate superior76 – 
and we recall that Pin had also celebrated marriages with a counterfeit license in the 
villages of Covolo and Corte. However, since a chaplain did not celebrate marriage 
as chaplain but as delegate of the priest, once again common error gave the Church 
the condition it needed to repair the defect. Based on the consensus of the two advi-
sors, the Holy Office instructed the bishop of Treviso not to intervene in any way 
in the existing situation, and if anyone should question one of these marriages, to 
admonish them to respect the bond („ut in matrimonio contracto quiescat“).77
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Conclusions
One of the declared aims of the decree Tametsi was to resolve the problem of clan-
destine marriage. The imposition of the presence of the parish priest and witnesses 
at weddings, however, did not mean an end to all questions regarding marital vali-
dity. Indeed, questions often arose from the new rules themselves, which proved 
liable to manipulation and varying interpretation, as attested by the vast documen-
tation of the Congregation of the Council.
By and large in the decades immediately following Tametsi the decisions of the 
Congregation either censured some still persistent preconciliar practice, or else 
reconfirmed the validity of practices that had already been explicitly confirmed by 
the Tridentine decrees. Both situations reveal an incomplete interiorization of the 
new marital rules, even within the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
Most of the Congregation’s work took place in the legal gap opened by Tametsi. 
As Benedict XIV himself pointed out, the council fathers required the presence of 
the couple’s parish priest at the wedding without specifying who exactly counted as 
this priest. A good part of the Congregation’s activity in marital matters was an att-
empt to respond to this deficiency.78 
The fact that the decrees of the Congregation of the Council originated in reso-
lutions of actual cases proves that the rule is the crystallization of practical expe-
rience, and should caution historians against assuming that rules can be an isolated 
object of study. Products of practice, the decrees of the Congregation of the Council 
went on in turn to influence the practice of marriage, and made a substantial con-
tribution to the development of bureaucratic management of nuptial matters. But 
the fact that the decrees were the product of at times passionate debate between 
widely divergent opinions allows us to glimpse at marital practices resistant to the 
discipline imposed by the Council, and an alternate, if ultimately unsuccessful, con-
ception of the control of marriage.
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